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What Do Executive Factors Contribute to the Failure on False Belief
Tasks by Children with Autism?
James Russell, Rebecca Saltmarsh, and Elisabeth Hill
Cambridge University, U.K.
As children with autism have pervasive executive difficulties it is necessary to determine
whether these contribute to their often-reported failure on the false belief task. Failure on
this task is frequently taken to diagnose the lack of a ‘‘ theory of mind’’. We report two
studies using two tasks that make similar executive demands to the false belief task. The first
experiment showed that children with autism are significantly challenged by a ‘‘conflicting
desire ’’ task, which suggests that their difficulty with the false belief task is not rooted in
difficulty with grasping the representational nature of belief. In the second study children
with autism were also found to be impaired on a novel version of the ‘‘ false photograph
task’’. A parsimonious reading of these data is that their difficulty with all three tasks is due
to commonalities in the tasks’ executive structure.
Keywords: Autism, executive functions, conflicting desires, false belief task, false photograph
task, diagnostic tests, cognition.
Abbreviations: BPVS: British Picture Vocabulary Scale ; MLD: moderate learning
difficulties ; TROG: Test for the Reception of Grammar; VMA: verbal mental age.
Introduction
It is a well-established finding that children with autism
are impaired on the false belief task, in which participants
must judge that a protagonist will search for something
on the basis of a false belief about its location rather than
on the basis of what they themselves know about its true
location (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985, for the
initial demonstration in autism; Wimmer & Perner, 1983,
for the original report of the task). Children with autism
also perform at a significantly lower level than controls
when they have to explain why the story protagonist
visited the wrong location (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan,
1994a). Because appreciating that false beliefs drive
erroneous actions is fundamental to understanding belief
per se and because understanding belief is fundamental to
a conception of mind, such results have been taken to
form the cornerstone of the hypothesis that the core
impairment in autism is in ‘‘ theory of mind’’ (Baron-
Cohen, 1995).
However, these findings do not in themselves dem-
onstrate that children with autism fail the false belief task
because they have an absent or weak understanding of
belief. This is because the task, while gauging the
understanding of the link between belief and action, also
makes significant executive demands. ‘‘Executive’’ can
mean a number of things (Rabbitt, 1997; Roberts,
Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1996) ; so what does it mean in
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this context? Although there is no universally
acknowledged definition of the term ‘‘executive
functions ’’ there is quite a broad consensus that an
executive task has the following two components (Dia-
mond, 1991; Pennington et al., 1997). First, the par-
ticipant has to suppress a prepotent but incorrect re-
sponse; second, he or she must retain action-relevant
information in working memory while doing so. Thus, in
the false belief task it is necessary to suppress one’s own
true belief whilst simultaneously holding in mind the
requirement to answer a question about what the pro-
tagonist will do. When we couple this with the fact that
children with autism have executive impairments that are
not only severe but arguably unique in nature
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; papers in Russell, 1997), it
can plausibly be argued that failing a task like false belief
and its cognates may be due, at least in part, to executive
difficulties".
This argument has equal, if not stronger, force when it
is applied to second-order false belief tasks (e.g. ‘‘What
does John think that Marywill think?’’) onwhich persons
with autismare impaired (Baron-Cohen, 1989).A second-
order false belief task may not in fact be testing for
mental concepts at a deeper level than the first-order task.
Most normal adults would struggle with, say, a fourth- or
" This analysis is somewhat less persuasive when the subject has
to explain erroneous search rather than predict which location
will be visited (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994a). But in this
case there is still a competition set up between the subject’s true
belief and the requirement to frame an answer in terms of their
representation of another’s belief state held in working memory.
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Table 1
Parallels between the Executive and Narrative Structures of the Tasks Used Here
False belief False photograph Conflicting desire
1. Child sees protagonist place object at
location A.
1. Child sees camera take a photograph
of situation A.
1. Child and opponent both want to win
card A.
2. Protagonist departs and the object is
moved to place B.
2. While the film is developing the
situation is changed to B.
2. The opponent fails to win card A but
child succeeds; so he now needs card B.
3. Protagonist returns and child is asked
where protagonist will look for the
object (or where he thinks it is).
3. Before the photograph is revealed the
child is asked what situation will be
pictured when the photograph is
turned over.
3. Before they begin to play again the
child is asked which card the
opponent wants to win.
Correct answer : The original location A. Correct answer : The original situation A. Correct answer : The originally desired
card A.
Executive demands : Inhibit reference to
one’s current and true belief while
framing an answer in terms of
protagonist’s false belief—false because
out-of-date.
Executive demands : Inhibit reference to
current situation while framing an
answer in terms of false photographic
representation of it—false because out-
of-date.
Executive demands : Inhibit reference to
one’s own current desire while framing
an answer in terms of the opponent’s
current desire—an out-of-date desire
from one’s own perspective.
fifth-order false belief task, but this would surely not be
because their understanding of mental life was
insufficiently deep. Rather, the second-order task might
only assess the ability to embed representations in
working memory, something that is tested, in an executive
context, through the use of planning tasks like the Tower
of Hanoi and the Tower of London, tasks on which
autistic participants are impaired (Hughes, Russell, &
Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).
Crucially, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994b) have
demonstrated that when second-order false belief tasks
are presented to autistic individuals in such a way that
this kind of holding-in-mind is not required, those
who pass the first-order tasks not only pass the second-
order ones but can also justify their answers appro-
priately.
A possible objection to this line of argument is that
children with autism are not specifically impaired on a
task that makes similar executive structure to the false
belief task but which makes no mentalising demands:
Zaitchik’s (1990) false photograph task (Leekam &
Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). If this is so—the
argument runs—they cannot be failing the false belief
task because of their executive difficulties. In the false
photograph task the child initially sees a photograph
taken of a certain physical situation, such as a doll in a red
dress (as in the Leekam & Perner study). Whilst the
photograph is developing the situation is changed in
some way (doll is put into a green dress). Then the child
is asked what colour dress the doll will be shown to be
wearing in the photograph. Alternatively, a toy animal
moves from the chair to the bed (in the Leslie & Thaiss
study) and the question concerns where the photograph
will show the toy to be located. Note that this kind of
task not only has a similar narrative structure to the
false belief task but also requires a grasp of represen-
tation: representation in a photograph, however, rather
than in a mind. See the first two panels of Table 1 for
the parallels between the tasks in narrative and executive
features.
The problem with this argument, however, is that it is
not clear that the false photograph task makes executive
demands of a similar severity to those made by the false
belief task. In the case of the Leekam and Perner study,
the child has to refer to what is in a photograph of an
earlier state of the model rather than refer to the updated
state of the model. If we assume that the child knows
what is in the photograph then the requirement reduces to
that of referring to what is known about a two-
dimensional physical state rather than to what is known
about a three-dimensional physical state. (Note that dolls
too are representations—of girls.) We cannot assume that
the former is necessarily less salient than the latter, and so
we cannot assume that the task encourages a strong
prepotent response. In the Leslie and Thaiss procedure
the child has, similarly, to refer to a two-dimensional
representation of an animal on a chair rather than a
three-dimensional representation of an animal on a bed.
Although the former is a representation of a represen-
tation, we cannot assume that its representational status
is any way diluted for the child. In fact we cannot even
safely assume that a two-dimensional representation of X
will be less salient than X itself. In any event, we will
assume for the time being that the implications of the
false photograph data for an executive account of false
belief failure in autism are at present unclear. We will
return to this question after our first experiment has been
reported.
In the first study we shall report on, the contribution of
executive difficulties to failure on the false belief task was
based on the following rationale. The false belief task
requires the child to understand that two individuals (self
and other) can have conflicting beliefs about reality. A
belief can be analysed as (1) the mental orientation of
holding true to (2) a particular representation of reality.
Thus, if children are to understand what it is to believe
something, they need to understand something about the
representing relation: what it means for X to be a
representation of Y (Perner, 1991). The situation is
different, however, for desire. Although some have taken
desire to be representational (Moses & Chandler, 1992,
p. 289), and while the verb to desire can take a ‘‘ that-
clause’’ (Perner, 1991, pp. 116–117 for discussion),
desiring is not fundamentally a matter of representing the
world as being a certain way. Thus, one can simply desire
an object without any attendant beliefs about the way the
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world is currently configured#. Thus, in English at least, it
is possible to say ‘‘I want it to be the case that I eat a
cheeseburger ’’, but we can of course simply say ‘‘I want
a cheeseburger ’’. We cannot by contrast say ‘‘*I believe a
cheeseburger ’’, and the fact that we cannot is more than
a matter of linguistic convention: it is due to the fact that
in believing we take the world to be a certain way (that Y
is the case) whereas in desiring we generally do not$.
On this analysis, understanding how two people can
have different and conflicting desires—self and other in
this case—is not a matter of understanding conflicting
mental representations. It is not a matter, in other words,
of understanding the representational nature of mind.
However, understanding conflicting desire sufficiently
well to answer questions about it makes the same kind of
executive demands as understanding conflicting beliefs. On
an executive analysis one’s own occurent mental states
(beliefs, desires, etc.) are arguably stronger than those of
others, and therefore more likely to determine behaviour
(e.g. the framing of a verbal judgement). The assumption
here that one’s actually being in a certain mental state is
a fundamentally different matter from one’s representing
the mental state of another, either by theory-application
or by simulation (Harris, 1991) : actually being subject to
it renders it more salient.
Using this argument, Moore et al. (1995) compared the
performance of groups of 3-year-old children on tasks in
which either their own beliefs or their own desires
conflicted with those of another (a doll). In addition to
being given a false belief task children were given one of
two conflicting desire tasks. In the first, they had a choice
of two stickers, one of which was much more attractive.
The assumption was that they would chose the more
attractive one. They were also told that the doll had an
unfortunate experience that had made him frightened
of the attractive sticker. They were then asked which
sticker the doll would choose. The correct answer was
taken to be the sticker that was not the children’s
preferred one. In the second conflicting desire task
children played a game against a doll in which they had to
win pieces of a jigsaw in an attempt to be the first to
complete a picture of a frog. They turned over coloured
cards which each represented a different jigsaw-piece. At
test, matters were arranged so that the child and the doll
needed cards of different colours ; the child was asked
which card the doll wanted. The correct answer was of
course to say which card the doll needed rather than
which card they themselves needed. See the third panel of
Table 1 for the executive parallel between this task and
the false belief task.
# One may say that certain background beliefs are in play when
one says, for example, ‘‘ I want a cheeseburger ’’—about
cheeseburgers being food and about them being tasty—but no
occurrent beliefs are. In contrast, the beliefs that the false belief
task concerns are occurrent beliefs.
$ In a recent House of Commons Select Committee hearing an
MP (David Willats) defended his interpretation of events by
trading on an ambiguity in desire. This was the ambiguity
between ‘‘want ’’ in the sense of being desirous of and ‘‘want ’’
in the sense of being in want of (e.g. ‘‘ I want for nothing’’). Such
an ambiguity cannot occur in belief. Belief is representational
through and through, and so we cannot be ‘‘ in belief of ’’.
Moore et al. found that these two conflicting desire
tasks were of a similar level of difficulty to the standard
false belief task. From this, they concluded that what was
responsible for the similarity in performance was the fact
that the two tasks made equivalent executive demands. If
the false belief task had proved more difficult than the
conflicting desire it would have provided evidence for
Perner’s (1991) view that the false belief task challenges
younger children because it taps an understanding of the
representing relation between a belief and what it is a
belief about—‘‘metarepresentation’’.
The purpose of our first experiment was to compare
conflicting desire with conflicting belief performance in
children with autism. We already know, of course, that
conflicting (i.e. false) belief tasks present these children
with significant difficulties. If conflicting desire proves to
be equally difficult then we will have evidence consistent
with the view that it is the executive nature of the tasks
that is challenging them. If, however, conflicting desire is
easier to understand we will have produced evidence
consistent with Leslie’s (1987) hypothesis that the under-
standing of metarepresentation is specifically impaired in
autism.
We gave the children only the second form of con-
flicting desire task used by Moore et al.—the frog jigsaw
task. This was because we had found in pilot studies that
children with autism did not tend to regard the relation
between fear of an object and shunning it in a way that
was necessary for the procedure to work. They were also
no more likely to pick the sticker that we had assessed to
be more attractive%.
Experiment 1
The desire in our conflicting desire task was an
individual’s need for a particular object in the context of
a game. The children had to appreciate that because they
have already obtained the card they initially needed, their
own desire has changed (they want a different card)
whereas the other player will continue to want the card he
or she initially wanted. (See the third panel of Table 1.)
As in the false belief task, an error consists of failing to
acknowledge that another’s mental state (desire}belief)
does not change when the child’s own mental state
(desire}belief) has changed. In the conflicting desire task
the change is brought about by the satisfaction of the
subject’s initial desire and by the lack of satisfaction of
the other’s. In the conflicting belief (or false belief) task it
is caused by the transferring of an object from one place
to the other, given that this changes the subject’s belief
without changing the other’s belief.
Method
Participants. A group of 32 children with autism and a group
of 32 children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) partici-
pated in the study. Their verbal mental ages (VMAs) ranged
between 3 and 8 years. In an initial session, all potential
participants (from a pool of 78 children) were assessed using the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn,
% A report of this study is available from the first author on
request.
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Table 2
Participant Details for Experiment 1
Age (months)
Autism group
(Nfl 32)
MLD group
(Nfl 32)
CA
Mean 135–0 124–0
SD 37–5 22–7
Range 82–229 86–170
VMA (BPVS)
Mean 69–1 69–2
SD 17–4 17–3
Range 36–99 39–100
VMA (TROG)
Mean 66–8 70–0
SD 18–3 19–6
Range 48–120 48–132
CA: chronological age.
Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982) and the Test for the Reception of
Grammar (TROG) (Bishop, 1982). Matching for the exper-
iment was carried out solely on the basis of the BPVS scores.
Participant details are given in Table 2. It can be seen from the
table that VMA estimates gleaned from the TROG were very
similar to those from the BPVS.
All the children with autism were drawn from schools or units
specifically for children with autism. They were selected if they
had been formally diagnosed as having autism or Asperger’s
syndrome. If a child had no firm diagnosis, then a questionnaire
based on the diagnostic criteria of DSM-II-R (American
Psychiatric Association, 1987) was completed by their teachers
as an informal check on the children’s symptoms and be-
haviour&. Of the 32 children assessed, 26 had a diagnosis of
autism, 3 a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome, and 3 were
included on the basis of the questionnaire’. The children with
MLD were attending special schools for children with a variety
of learning difficulties.
Materials and design. Each child received two tasks: a con-
flicting desire task and a false belief task, with order of
presentation being counterbalanced. A ‘‘Daffy Duck’’ glove
puppet was used in both. In addition, two cardboard boxes, one
red and one blue, were used in both tasks. In the conflicting
desire task a set of coloured cards and two identical frog jigsaw
puzzles were also used. The puzzles were made up of three
pieces : the frog’s body, its head, and its eyes. The eyes fitted
onto the head, which in turn fitted onto the body.
Procedure. This was identical to that used by Moore et al.
(1995). (The protocols are to be found in the Appendix). In the
false belief task the child watched as Daffy put his money in the
red box and left the scene. The experimenter moved Daffy’s
money to the blue box and subsequently asked the child where
Daffy thinks his money is, after control questions had been
asked concerning the original location of the money, its current
location, and whether the puppet was aware of the transfer.
In the conflicting desire task, children played a game against
the puppet. The aim of the game was to be the first to complete
a frog jigsaw puzzle. Both players started with a body piece, and
subsequently they had to first win the frog’s head and then its
eyes. The head pieces for both players were placed in the red box
& This questionnaire is available from the first author on
request.
’ Inspection of the data showed that the six children who did
not have a diagnosis of autism performed similarly to those who
did have this diagnosis.
and the eye pieces in the blue box. It was explained to the
children that the coloured cards in the pack before them corres-
ponded to the colours on the box. Consequently, if a player drew
a red card he won the head. Having done so, if he drew a blue
card he would win the eyes. A yellow card was neutral and, if
drawn, the player had to allow their opponent to turn over a
card. Initially, therefore, both players wanted a red card. If
either drew a red card to win a head, their desire would be ful-
filled and changed to that for a blue card. The pack of cards was
stacked so as to ensure that the child always drew a red card
before the puppet. Once children had drawn the red card and
had fitted the head to the frog’s body they were asked the three
control questions that paralleled those used in false belief tasks.
They were then asked a question about Daffy’s current desire :
‘‘Which colour does Daffy want now?’’.
Results
In the false belief task, every child correctly answered
the control questions concerning where the object had
been placed initially and where it was currently located.
Eleven children with autism and one child with MLD
failed the control question that concerned whether the
protagonist knew where the object was currently located.
On the assumption that this question about the another’s
knowledge state is a question about mental represen-
tation, and because there has been found to be a strong
statistical contingency between success on the knowledge
question and on the belief questions (Lumb & Russell,
1996), we counted the 12 children who failed the
knowledge question as failing the whole task. Accord-
ingly, 34% of the children with autism were counted as
passing the false belief task (11 from 32), as against 84%
of the children with MLD (27 from 32). This difference
was statistically significant [v#(1)fl 8–57, p!–01] ; see
Table 3.
Turning to the conflicting desire task, 50% of the
children with autism correctly answered the other-desire
question (16 from 32), as against 78% of the children
with MLD (25 from 32). This group difference was
statistically significant [v#(1)fl 6–22, p!–025]. However,
the question about the child’s own desire was also failed
by 5 of the 16 children with autism who had failed the
other-desire question, and by 3 of the children with
MLD. It could be argued that these 8 children could not
have been failing the task because they had been in-
fluenced by the prepotent lure of their own desire (which
they failed to report), so we reanalysed the group
differences excluding the data from these children (see
Table 3). The group difference on conflicting desire
(other’s belief) remained significant [v#(1)fl 5–28, p!
–05].
Overall, the children did not find one of the tasks to be
more difficult than the other [Cochrane’s Q(1)fl–20,
n.s.]. This was also true at the level of the group. There
was no difference in task difficulty in the children with
autism [Q(1)fl 1–14, n.s.] nor in the children with MLD
[Q(1)fl–67]. Finally, within each group there was no
significant relationship between performance on the two
tests [u correlations both p"–05].
Discussion
These data show that a conflicting desire task that
requires subjects to answer in terms of another’s desire
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Table 3
Performance of the Two Groups in Experiment 1 on the Two Tasks (32 Participants per Group)
False belief task Conflicting desire task
Group Passing Failing Passing Failing (including)a Failing (excluding)b
Children with autism 11 (34%) 21 (66%) 16 (50%) 16 (50%) 11 (34%)
Children with MLD 27 (84%) 5 (16%) 25 (78%) 7 (22%) 4 (12–5%)
a Including those failing the own-desire question.
b Excluding those failing the own-desire question.
rather than in terms of their own updated desire is nearly
as challenging to children with autism as the false belief
task. The false belief task can, as we have argued, equally
be regarded as a conflicting belief task. Performance on
the conflicting desire task by children with autism was
significantly worse than that of VMA-matched children
with mental handicap. These data parallel those of Moore
et al. (1995) insofar as conflicting desire and false belief
performance is similar in the two groups. The percentage
success on the conflicting desire task in the children with
autism (excluding those who failed the own-desire ques-
tion) happened to have been identical to that of the
normally developing 3-year-olds in Moore et al.’s study
(34%).
How do these data relate to previous studies of the
understanding of desire in children with autism? These
studies have shown that children with autism are able to
predict a protagonist’s desire on the basis of his or her
initial preference and that they are able to match desires
with outcomes (Baron-Cohen, 1991a; Phillips, Baron-
Cohen, & Rutter, 1995). Also, Tan and Harris (1991)
have shown that children with autism will re-assert their
original desire when what they have been given turns out
not to correspond to it. Baron-Cohen (1991b) addition-
ally reports that children with autism are no worse than
mentally handicapped controls in predicting a pro-
tagonist’s emotion on the basis of a fulfilled or unfulfilled
desire. Children with autism are reported, moreover, to
talk about desire in a relatively normal manner outside
the laboratory (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). In short, the
understanding of desire seems to be adequate in autism.
With regard to the present study, if the understanding of
desire is essentially normal in autism, then the case is
strengthened for saying that the understanding of con-
flicting desire challenges these children by reason of the
executive demands made in the task, not because of their
poor understanding of that mental state.
While the children with autism were significantly worse
than the MLD children on the conflicting desire task, it is
also the case that the group difference was somewhat
more marked on the false belief task. The children with
autism seem to have been challenged more by the false
belief task, whereas this was not true for the children with
MLD. Does this not suggest that the metarepresen-
tational nature of belief was causing the children with
autism additional problems? This is possible. Indeed, we
do not wish to insist that the false belief task challenges
children with autism solely by virtue of its executive
demands. However there is an alternative explanation for
the more notable difficulty of the false belief task in the
autism group. As was pointed out earlier, passing the
false belief task required children to answer two mental-
state questions correctly rather than one: the knowledge
question (Does the protagonist know about the transfer?)
and the belief question. This is tantamount—on the
present argument—to increasing the executive demands.
We now consider an alternative interpretation of the
data. It could be proposed that children with autism do
indeed have a weak grasp of desire, and this is part of
their generally weak grasp of all kinds of mental state.
This difficulty with desire—on this argument—did not
show up in the studies mentioned earlier because the tasks
used were insufficiently challenging (e.g. matching desires
with outcomes may be done by matching a sentence with
an outcome). However, a task in which their own desire is
pitted against that of another reveals how weak their
grasp of desire really is. In other words, it is not the
executive demands of the task per se that made it difficult
for the children with autism but rather the fact that the
conflict that had been set up was between two mental
states, albeit nonrepresentational ones.
This alternative hypothesis makes the following pre-
diction: children with autism will be mental-age-normal
on a task that is executive in structure, that requires some
understanding of misrepresentation, but which does not
have a mental content. The false photograph task
(described in the Introduction) fits this description and,
as we have seen, two published studies have shown it to be
correct (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992).
Children with autism do not appear to be challenged by
the false photograph task. Therefore—the argument
runs—they cannot be failing the false belief task for
executive reasons. We have seen, however, that the
assumption that the false photograph task makes execu-
tive demands similar to those of the false belief task can
be challenged.
We earlier raised the question of whether the false
photograph task does indeed encourage a prepotent
response sufficiently strong to challenge participants who
have executive difficulties. This is because it is not clear
that the contents of a two-dimensional representation
(e.g. that of a doll in a red dress) is necessarily less salient
than that of a three-dimensional representation (the doll,
representing a girl, in a green dress). We cannot even
safely assume that a photograph of X is less salient than
X itself or some updated state of X. Accordingly, our aim
in the second experiment was to find out how children
with autism perform when they are given a version of the
false photograph task in which the prepotency is sub-
stantially boosted—in which assumptions about relative
salience and what is a prepotent response are more solidly
grounded. Our assumption was that, although judge-
ments about prepotency are inevitably subjective to
some degree, it is hardly debatable that the presence of
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something is more salient than its absence. Thus, the
arrival of a focal object onto a scene in which previously
there was none would be expected to encourage execu-
tively challenged subjects to frame an answer that refers
to it.
In our modified version of the false photograph task
there was initially no object before the camera (apart
from a screen), and the object was introduced while the
film was developing. At test, the children had to refrain
from saying that the camera would develop a picture of
the newly arrived object. If executive factors have a
significant role to play in the difficulty that children with
autism have with false belief tasks then they should be less
likely to answer this question correctly than control
children.
Experiment Two
Method
Participants. Two groups of children took part in the study:
25 children with autism and 25 children with MLD. They were
matched for VMA on the BPVS (see Table 4). Because the
chronological ages of the children with autism were somewhat
higher than those of the MLD group we also compared the
verbal IQs of the two groups. These were not significantly
different [t(48)fl 1–01, p"–05]. The backgrounds of the chil-
dren were similar to those of the children in our first experiment.
Indeed, a number of them had served in that experiment. This
time all of the 25 children with autism had received formal
diagnoses of autism.
Design. The two groups of children and adolescents were
given three tasks : a standard false photograph task, a modified
(i.e. with increased prepotency) false photograph task, and a
false belief task.
Table 4
Participant Details in Experiment 2
Autism group
(Nfl 25)
MLD group
(Nfl 25)
CA (months)
Mean 148–0 128–0
SD 32–3 22–2
Range 79–200 93–188
VMA (months)
Mean 88–0 83–0
SD 25–0 26–4
Range 39–114 42–117
Table 5
Numbers and Proportions of Children per Group Passing the Tasks from a Total of 25 in Experiment 2
Group
False
belief
False
photograph
Modified false
photograph
(plus memory
failers)
Modified false
photograph
(minus memory
failers)
Q
significance
Autism 10 (40%) 22 (89%) 10 (40%) 10 (62–5%) p!–001
MLD 23 (92%) 22 (89%) 18 (74%) 18 (100%) n.s.
Chi significance p!–001 n.s. p!–05 p!–025
Apparatus. In both false photograph tasks a Polaroid camera
was used. In addition, a coloured screen (40‹30 cm) was set up
as a backdrop for the photographs. Children were allowed to
choose one of three toys to photograph in the training phase (a
plastic frog, a wooden car, and a plastic horse). In all three tasks
an Action Man and a Barbie doll were used. A marble and two
cardboard boxes were also used in the false belief task.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet
room in their school. At the start of each session they were famil-
iarised with the Polaroid camera. The experimenter erected the
backdrop screen and allowed them to choose one of the three
toys to place in front of it. The experimenter then helped each
participant to take a picture of his or her chosen toy, after which
they discussed the resulting photograph. The three tasks then
followed, whose order of presentation was counterbalanced.
(1) Modified false photograph task. The screen remained in
place, but without a toy in front of it. The experimenter said:
‘‘ I’m going to take another photo. I’m looking through the little
window and I’m pointing the camera over there (towards the
screen). I’ve pressed the button and I’ve taken a photo. Here it
is.’’ Once the photograph emerged from the camera the
experimenter placed it face down on the table and said, ‘‘Now
we have to wait while the picture gets clear. While we are
waiting let’s get something out of my bag. Look I’ve got Barbie
here. [Action Man was used for male subjects.] I know, while we
are waiting, let’s let Barbie sit here. The picture’s coming out
now.’’ The experimenter indicated the back of the photograph
and asked the following questions :
Control question : ‘‘When I took the photo, where was Barbie? ’’
(Correct answer : in the experimenter’s bag.)
Test question : ‘‘What will we be able to see in the photo when
it’s ready?’’
(Correct answer : pointing to screen, saying the colour of the
screen, or saying something equivalent to ‘‘nothing’’ or
‘‘nobody’’.)
(2) Standard false photograph task. With the screen in place
the experimenter said ‘‘Now look who I’ve got in my bag; it’s
Barbie. Barbie’s going to sit over here [the experimenter placed
the doll in front of the screen]. I’m going to take another photo.
I’m looking through the little window and I’m pointing the
camera over there. I’ve pressed the button and I’ve taken a
photo. Here it is.’’ Once the photograph emerged from the
camera the experimenter placed it face down on the table and
said, ‘‘Now we have to wait while the picture gets clear. While
we are waiting let’s put Barbie away. There, Barbie has gone
back into my bag. Oh, look who else is in here, it’s Action Man.
Let’s put Action Man on the table instead of Barbie. Now
Action Man’s sitting on the table. The picture’s coming out
now.’’ The experimenter pointed to the back of the photograph
and asked the following two questions in the following order:
Control question : ‘‘When I took the photo, where was Barbie? ’’
(Correct answer : in front of the camera.)
Test question : ‘‘What will we be able to see in the photo when
it’s ready?’’
(Correct answer : Barbie.)
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(3) False belief task. The experimenter said, ‘‘Now I’m going
to tell you a story. This is Barbie and this is Action Man.
They’ve got a red box and a blue box. [The child was told to
point to each box in turn.] Look, Barbie’s got a marble. Barbie’s
putting her marble into the red box and now she’s going out to
play. While Barbie’s outside, Action Man’s taken the marble
out of the red box and is playing with it. Now he’s putting it
away. Look, he’s putting it in the blue box. So the marble is in
the blue box now, it has changed places. Barbie doesn’t know
that the marble has been moved. Here comes Barbie, she wants
the marble.’’ At this point the experimenter asked the following
questions in the following order:
Reality question (control) : ‘‘Where is the marble now?’’
Memory question (control) : ‘‘Where was the marble in the
beginning?’’
Belief question (test) : ‘‘Where does Action Man think his
marble is? ’’
Note that, in contrast to Experiment 1, we did not ask the
‘‘knowledge’’ control question. This was in order to reduce the
difference between the number of questions asked in the false
photograph tasks and in the false belief tasks(.
Results and Discussion
The control question in the modified false photograph
task (about where the doll was when the photograph was
taken) was almost invariably failed by saying that the doll
had been in front of the screen. However children with
autism were not significantly more likely to make this
error (36%) than the children with MLD (28%) [v#, p"
–05]. Note that, as in the previous study, more control
questions had to be included in the false belief task.
There was no difference in task difficulty within the
MLD group [Q(3)fl 4–94, n.s.]. By contrast, there was a
significant effect of task in the children with autism [Q(2)
fl 15–16, p!–001]. Table 5 shows this to be due to the
fact that the autistic group found the false photograph
task in its standard format much easier than the other two
tasks.
It can also be seen from Table 5 that the same number
of children in each group passed the false photograph
task in its standard format, in which an object was
initially photographed and then replaced. In both groups
89% of the children succeeded. This is in line with
previous studies. It was also to be expected that the
children with MLD would outperform children with
autism on the false belief task, and this seems to have
been the case. Performance on the modified false photo-
graph task was also superior in the MLD children.
Hierarchical log linear analyses were carried out to test
both for group differences and order effects, with these
factors being entered in a saturated model. In the false
belief task, group membership, but not order, signifi-
cantly affected performance [v#(1)fl 15–1, p!–001]. In
the modified false photograph task group membership
also had a significant effect. This was true both when
those who failed the memory control question were
included within the failing group [v#(1)fl 5–1, p!–05]
( It should be noted that the knowledge question was neither
asked in the original false belief study of Wimmer and Perner
(1983) nor in the original demonstration of autistic difficulty
with the task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Table 6
Contingency Table of Modified False Photograph
Performance (25 per Group)
Group Passing
Failing
(including)a
Failing
(excluding)b
Group
Children with autism 10 15 6
Children with MLD 18 7 0
a Including those failing the memory control.
b Excluding those failing the memory control.
and when they were excluded from the analysis entirely
[v#(1)fl 6–13, p!–025]—see Tables 5 and 6. With regard
to order, children were also more likely to pass the
modified false photograph task if it had been presented
after the standard false photograph task [v#(1)fl 4–72,
p!–05].
The children with autism found the modified false
photograph task significantly harder than the standard
version [McNemar v#(1)fl 6–67, p!–01]. This was not
the case in the children with MLD [McNemar v#(1)fl
1–5, p"–2]. The latter result has to be interpreted with
caution, however, given that ceiling effects were probably
operating in this group.
Finally, it is notable that when control question failers
were counted as task failers, exactly the same number of
children with autism (40% of the total) passed the
modified false photograph task as passed the false belief
task. There was, however, no correlation between per-
formance on the two tasks within the autistic group [ufl
2–48, p"–05]. Thus, although the two tasks were of
similar difficulty for the children with autism it was not
the case that the same children tended to pass or fail both.
Of the three tasks, then, the false belief task and the
modified false photograph were the ones that challenged
the children with autism, with the children with MLD
performing well in all three. This pattern is consistent
with the claim that the false belief task makes heavy
executive demands upon children with autism. It might
be objected, however, that the original version of the false
photograph task is more ‘‘natural ’’ than the modified
version, given that people do not normally take photo-
graphs with only a backdrop before the camera, and
given that children may find it unnatural to answer that a
photograph shows nothing or shows only the backdrop.
While this is true, one can also argue that the modified
version of the false photograph task parallels the false
belief task more closely than does the standard version in
at least one respect. In the false belief task the child is
faced with the choice of referring to a place at which there
is something as against a place at which there is nothing.
A comparable demand is present in the modified false
photograph task insofar as the test question requires the
subject to refer to the null contents of a photograph
(instead of referring to a box without contents).
General Discussion
Our first experiment demonstrated that children with
autism are challenged by a task in which they have to
inhibit reference to their own current desire while framing
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an answer on the basis of another’s desire. Indeed their
degree of difficulty was nearly equivalent to the difficulty
they experience with the false belief task. Because one can
regard the false belief task as requiring subjects to inhibit
reference to their current true belief while framing an
answer about another’s, it is possible to conclude that the
tasks challenge children with autism for the same reason.
They make the classic executive demands of having to
inhibit a prepotent response whilst keeping action-
relevant information in mind.
However, the first experiment does not tell us that it is
executive factors alone which make both conflicting
desire and conflicting belief (false belief) tasks hard for
children with autism. This is because both tasks are
mental-state tasks. These data do, though, undermine the
view that it is the representational aspect of mind, in
particular, which is difficult to grasp in autism (as claimed
by Leslie, 1987), given that desire tasks do not require
subjects to understand what it means for the mind to
represent the world as being a certain way. Therefore, in
order to test the stronger claim that the false belief task
challenges children with autism essentially through its
executive structure it would be necessary to show that a
non-mentalistic (but representational) task with a similar
executive structure to that of the false belief task is
equally as challenging as the false belief task.
The two published studies showing mental-age-normal
performance by children with autism on the false photo-
graph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992) would seem to have undermined this claim.
However, the assumption that the false photograph task
clearly requires the inhibition of a prepotent response can
be questioned on the grounds that a two-dimensional
representation (e.g. photograph of a doll in a green dress)
may not necessarily be less cognitively salient than a
three-dimensional representation (a doll in a red dress).
We argued that if the camera initially took a picture with
no focal object before it and the child were asked, after an
object had meanwhile been stationed before the camera,
what the film will show, this would challenge any
participants who had executive difficulties. This con-
jecture was confirmed: the children with autism per-
formed significantly worse on the modified false photo-
graph task than did the children with MLD; they were
also worse on the false belief task; but they performed at
exactly the same level as the children with MLD on the
standard version of the false photograph task.
Before commenting on the significance of these data
for the study of autism, we need to confront the question
of why the false photograph task is difficult for normally
developing preschool children. In fact it is a little more
difficult than the false belief task (Zaitchik, 1990). It is
not possible, within our rationale, to say that the task is
difficult for executive reasons, particularly if one also
wants to claim that the false belief task challenges
normally developing children because of the executive
demands it makes (Moore et al., 1995). It is possible that
false photograph tasks challenge normally developing
children because they do not understand referential
opacity. We know that their difficulties with the logical
opacity created by mental verbs continues beyond the
fifth year of life (Russell, 1987). Thus, when they hear
questions such as ‘‘In the picture, what colour is Julie? ’’
(Leekam & Perner) or ‘‘In this photograph who is sitting
in this toy box?’’ (Leslie & Thaiss) they fail to appreciate
—for whatever reason—that the reading should be
logically opaque rather than logically transparent). Their
reading might be translated as ‘‘What colour is Julie (who
has been photographed)? ’’ or ‘‘Who is sitting in this
toybox (which has been photographed)? ’’.
Finally, what do these data imply, then, about the
nature and severity of mentalising difficulties in autism?
It is naive to conclude that they undermine the view that
there are mentalising difficulties in autism. For even if
one ignores the clinical picture and Kanner’s original
description of the syndrome, children and adults with
autism are impaired on tasks with mental contents that
do not make the kinds of executive demand described
above. For example, they find it more difficult than
controls to discriminate mental from non-mental verbs
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1994, Expt. 1) ; they find it difficult
to interpret the mental ‘‘ language of the eyes ’’ (Baron-
Cohen,Wheelwright,& Jolliffe, 1997) ; and they find irony
difficult to detect (Happe! , 1993). That said, these data do
not tell us that individuals with autism lack a theory of
mind: they show us that individuals with autism do not
operate with this ‘‘ theory’’ (on a very loose definition of
the word) very efficiently, or do not operate with it in the
same way that we do. Moreover, it could be said that
answering questions about figurative language—
especially irony—requires the subject to inhibit reference
to reality ; and this is an executive demand.
It is necessary, however, to insert that caveat that
Experiment 2 does not, by strict logic, demonstrate that
children with autism fail executive tasks because of the
executive demands these tasks make. This is because it is
possible that children with autism fail the false belief task
because of its mentalistic content and fail the modified
false photograph because of its executive demands, with
the standard false photograph task posing no problems
because itmakes neither kindof demand.However ‘‘strict
logic ’’ can sometimes be in tension with the requirement
to prefer the more parsimonious explanation. The false
belief task does indeed make executive demands (both a
priori and as suggested by the results of Experiment 1), as
does the modified false photograph task; and that is all
they share. So it is difficult to insist that they may be
difficult for different reasons. Further research is certainly
needed to clarify the question.
What these data do achieve, at least, is the exerting of
pressure on the idea that failing the false belief task is an
acid test for possessing a theory of mind in a clinical
group. The clearest manifestation of this way of thinking
) Logically opaque contexts can be created in a number of
ways, but their creation by mental verbs is the easiest to
appreciate. For example, in the sentence ‘‘Oedipus thought
Jocasta was desirable ’’ the truth-value changes from true to
false if we replace ‘‘Jocasta’’ with ‘‘his mother ’’, despite the fact
that both terms refer to the same person. To think that such a
replacement is permissible is to fail to appreciate logical opacity.
Similarly, in the context of pictorial rather than mental
representation, the opaque rather than transparent reading can
be required. See Fauconnier (1985) for a discussion of the
parallels between the two kinds of logical opacity—pictorial
and verbal.
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is to be found among those who feel that the theory-of-
mind deficit hypothesis of autism is threatened by the fact
that some autistic subjects pass the test whilst presenting
as no less autistic than those who fail it (Happe! , 1993).
This apparent challenge is usually surmounted by saying
that these individuals have, by virtue of their age and
verbal intelligence, managed to work out the right answer
to such puzzles by generalising from past instances
without insight into the general principle—the so-called
‘‘hacking out’’ of a solution (Happe! , 1993, pp. 57–58).
But it can be argued that such a challenge to the theory-
of-mind-deficit hypothesis is minor when set against the
more general concern that the false belief task makes
deeply ambiguous demands: that it can be failed for
reasons that may have rather little to do with lacking a
concept of belief.
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Appendix
Experiment 1: False Belief Task
Children are shown two empty boxes, one red and one blue.
Daffy enters and the experimenter says, ‘‘Here comes Daffy.
Daffy’s been working in a shop all day and has earned this
money. Look, one pound! Daffy is going to put his money away
in the red box [Daffy opens the red box, places his money inside
and closes the lid]. Now he’s going out to play. He will come
back for his money later [Daffy is put into the experimenter’s
bag]. Let’s play a trick on Daffy. Let’s move his money to the
blue box [The experimenter takes the coin out of the red box,
puts it in the blue box and closes both boxes]. Daffy is coming
back now and wants to find his money.’’
As Daffy is returning, the following three control questions
are asked:
Initial state question : ‘‘Where did Daffy put his money at the
start? ’’
Current state question : ‘‘Where is the money now?’’
Protagonist’s state question : ‘‘Does Daffy know that we’ve
moved the money?’’
Children were then asked the belief question:
Belief question : ‘‘Where does Daffy think the money is now?’’
Experiment 1: Conflicting Desire Task
Children are told how to play the game: ‘‘Let’s play a game
with Daffy. Look at these frogs. Let’s take one apart and put it
back together again [The experimenter shows the child how the
puzzle fits together]. Now this is how to play the game. You
both start off with just a body and we put both of the heads in
this red box and both sets of eyes in this blue box. Then you and
Daffy take it in turns to pick up a card. If you pick a red card,
like that, then you get a head from the red box and put it on the
frog’s body like this. Then you pick up cards until…you get a
blue card like that. When you get a blue card, you can get some
eyes from the blue box and you have won. Remember, you can’t
get the eyes from the blue box until you have the head from the
red box. Do you understand? Daffy thinks he’s good at this
game. Do you want to play with him?’’
The child and Daffy begin to play. Once the child has drawn
a red card and fitted the head onto the body of the frog, three
control questions are asked:
Initial state question : ‘‘Which colour card did you get last
time?’’
Current state question : ‘‘Which colour card do you want
now?’’
Protagonist’s state question : ‘‘Has Daffy won a head yet? ’’
The child is then asked the following test questions :
Other desire question : ‘‘Which colour card does Daffy want
now?’’
Own outdated desire question : ‘‘Which colour card did you want
last time?’’
